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EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION-STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS' 
RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE: A LOOK AT PUBLIC LAW SCHOOLS' 
NONDISCRIMINATION POLICIES AND THEIR ApPLICATION TO 
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY STUDENT CHAPTERS 
INTRODUCTION 
The Christian Legal Society (CLS) is very serious about "filing 
'free speech' lawsuits ... across the country" in order to prevent 
law schools from applying their nondiscrimination l policies to its 
student chapters.2 Applying the universities' nondiscrimination 
policies would revoke the CLS's status as a recognized student or­
ganization, unless the CLS allowed non-Christians and homosexu­
als to become members of the local student chapters.3 The loss of 
recognized status would divest the CLS chapters of particular bene­
fits. The CLS argues that it should not have to open up its doors to 
people who do not share its members' beliefs, and furthermore, that 
doing so would infringe upon, among other things, its freedom of 
expressive association.4 
This Note focuses on current litigation between the CLS and 
public law schools and argues that applying antidiscrimination poli­
cies to the CLS student chapters and other student religious groups 
is justified notwithstanding the groups' First Amendment expres­
sive rights. Part I of this Note will discuss the background neces­
sary to analyze the arguments advanced by both the CLS and the 
law schools. In particular, it introduces the basic concepts associ­
ated with First Amendment expressive protections; and it analyzes 
viewpoint discrimination, including a background discussion of as­
sociational speech and compelled speech jurisprudence. Part II of 
1. These are also referred to as "antidiscrimination policies." 
2. E.J. Montini, ASU Students Suing For 'Right' to Discriminate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Jan. 2, 2005, at BlO, available at LEXIS. 
3. Id. 
4. Mark Hansen, Christians On Campus: Legal Society Says Universities Must Let 
It Choose Members, Officers Based on Beliefs, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2005, at 12-13, available 
at 91-FEB ABA J. 12 (Westlaw). 
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this Note discusses both the essence of the CLS and the relevant 
public law schools' nondiscrimination policies. Part III analyzes ar­
guments made by the CLS and those made by the law schools. It 
concludes that the CLS must comply with the schools' nondiscrimi­
nation policies if it desires official campus recognition. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. First Amendment Free Speech Protections 
The First Amendment provides citizens of the United States 
with the freedom of religion, freedom of speech and press, freedom 
to assemble, and freedom to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.5 The freedoms of speech and press, as enumerated in 
the First Amendment, are fundamental American ideals, "For it is a 
prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always 
with perfect good taste."6 Such freedoms may not be silenced or 
suppressed simply because they are unpopular, extreme, controver­
sial, or in poor taste.? Along with freedom of speech in the tradi­
tional sense, the First Amendment protects the freedoms of 
association.s Specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized two 
protected associational freedoms under the First Amendment-in­
timate association9 and expressive association.10 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
6. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941). 
7. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 497 (2005) (citing Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Org. for a 
Better Austin V. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Street V. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); 
Murdock V. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)). 
8. Roberts V. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (citing U.S. Jaycees V. 
McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (1983)). Although the First Amendment does not articu­
late a freedom of association, the Court has recognized that the amendment embodies 
such freedoms. City of Dallas V. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19,25 (1989). In Democratic Party 
of United States V. Wisconsin, the Court clearly reiterated this sentiment when it stated 
that the "First Amendment freedom to gather in association for the purpose of advanc­
ing shared beliefs is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by any 
State." Democratic Party of U.S. V. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981). 
9. Intimate association, not particularly relevant here, prohibits the government 
from impeding upon or interfering with an individuals right to choose to engage in 
relationships such as those centered on the idea of creating, maintaining, and develop­
ing a family, including marriage and the raising of children. Sanitation & Recycling 
Indus., Inc. V. City of N.Y., 107 F.3d 985, 996 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 
619). 
10. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. V. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 438 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18). 
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1. Expressive Association 
Expressive association protects an individual's right to associ­
ate in groups in order to engage in basic First Amendment free­
doms of religion, speech, press, and assembly.ll More, the 
protection of associational groups allows citizens to engage in free­
doms such as the pursuit of political, educational, and religious 
means.12 Protection of associational groups is necessary to prevent 
oppression by the majority.B An expressive group's ability to se­
lect and exclude members is protected, but not unconditionally, by 
the freedom of expressive association.14 Although the constitu­
tional protection is broad, freedom of expressive association does 
not protect all groups,15 for example, those that are only inciden­
tally expressive.16 
a. Expressive Association and the Roberts Trilogy 
Until 2000, expressive association claims were analyzed under 
the framework articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees,17 Board of Directors of Rotary In­
ternational v. Rotary Club of Duarte,18 and New York State Club 
Ass'n v. City of New York 19 (hereinafter referred to as the Roberts 
trilogy).2o Under the framework of the Roberts trilogy, an organi­
11. Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc., 107 F.3d at 996. 
12. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 
886,907-09,932-33 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982); In re Primus, 
436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977». 
13. Id. at 622 (citing Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958». 
14. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617; Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); 
N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988). 
15. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. 
16. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. For example, in City of Dallas v. Stanglin, the Court 
found that patrons of a dancehall were not members of any organized association, and 
held that a mere "kernel of expression" found in everyday activity is not sufficient to 
bring the group or activity within the ambit of constitutional protection. City of Dallas 
v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19,25-26 (1989). Conversely, the Dale Court found that the Scouts 
engaged in expressive activity worthy of associational protection because, in part, the 
Scouts mission was to "'instill values in young people.'" Dale, 530 U.S. at 649 (quoting 
the Boy Scouts' "Scout Oath"). 
17. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609. 
18. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
19. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 (1988). 
20. Adrianne K. Zahner, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Conflicts Between 
Antidiscrimination Laws and Freedom of Expressive Association After Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 373, 375-77 (2001). Roberts, Duarte, and New 
York Stale Club Ass'n are referred to as the Robercs trilogy. Susan Frances, Note, 
760 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:757 
zation making an expressive association claim was required to show 
that the nondiscrimination policy, if applied to the organization, 
would have "significantly burden[ed] the organization's expressive 
activities. "21 If the organization successfully met this burden, then 
the court balanced the organization's interest in expressive associa­
tion against the state's interest in eliminating discrimination.22 
Under the Roberts trilogy, the Court viewed the state's interest in 
eliminating discrimination as compelling per se.23 
Essentially, Roberts and Duarte held that eradicating gender 
discrimination in places of public accommodation was a compelling 
state interest. State antidiscrimination laws, which accomplished 
their goals via the least restrictive means and were not motivated by 
the suppression of ideas, were therefore constitutional.24 The Court 
reached the same result in New York State Club Ass'n.25 More 
noteworthy, the Court seemed to back down from its holdings in 
the previous two cases. In Roberts and Duarte, the Court stated in 
dicta that an organization could potentially prove that a state ac­
commodations statute violated its First Amendment rights.26 The 
Court explained that a group that could show that it was organized 
for expressive purposes and would "not be able to advocate its de­
sired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it [could not] confine its 
Every Judgment is a Weapon if You Hold it Right: Right to Expressive Association in 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 361, 362 (2002). 
21. Zahner, supra note 20, at 386. 
22. Id. (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 n.19). 
23. Id. at 387. 
24. Id. In Roberts, the Court found that a Minnesota statute, which forced the 
United States Jaycees to accept women as members, would not infringe upon the organ­
ization's ability to engage in constitutionally protected rights, or prevent the organiza­
tion from expressing its ideas. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627. Moreover, the Court stated 
that the forced inclusion of women would not seriously undermine the Jaycees' message 
of "promoting the interests of young men." Id. at 627. Similarly, the Court in Duarte 
found that a California statute that forced Rotary Clubs within the state to accept fe­
male members was constitutional. Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549. The Court held that admit­
ting women would have no significant effect on the Club's expressive activities 
evidenced by the Club's refusal to take positions on political issues. [d. at 548. 
25. N. Y. State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 18. In New York State Club Ass'n, the 
Court rejected the Club's First Amendment challenge of a New York statute which 
made it unlawful for any "institution, club or place of accommodation" to "withhold 
from or deny to such person any of the accommodations" because of "race, creed, 
color, national origin or sex of any person." Id. at 4 n.1. 
26. See id. at 1, 13. 
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membership,"27 would have a strong expressive association claim in 
lieu of the state's antidiscrimination law.28 
b. Expressive Association After Dale 
In Dale, the Court partially abandoned the framework it had 
used under the Roberts trilogy.29 James Dale had sued the Boy 
Scouts of America after they discovered that he was an "avowed 
homosexual and gay rights activist"30 and removed him from his 
position as an assistant scoutmaster. He claimed that by revoking 
his membership, the Scouts had violated New Jersey's public ac­
commodations statute.31 
The Court first found that the Boy Scouts were an organization 
that "engages in expressive activity."32 Next, the Court asked 
whether forcing the Scouts to accept Dale as a member would un­
dermine or "significantly affect the Boy Scouts' ability to advocate 
public or private viewpoints."33 The Court found that the Scouts 
sincerely held the view that homosexual behavior is inconsistent 
with its "Scout Oath" and conflicts with the Scouts' "core mes­
sage."34 The Court then opined that the forced inclusion of James 
Dale would "significantly burden the organization's right to oppose 
or disfavor homosexual conduct."35 Thereafter, the Court 
wandered from the framework it had laid out in the Roberts tril­
27. Id. at 13. Specifically, the Court mentioned groups that wished to restrict 
membership on the basis of sex or religion. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 658-59; see also Zahner, supra note 20, at 386-88 ("The 
Dale analysis did not follow the analytical framework laid out in the Roberts trilogy.... 
[It] departed from the second part of the Roberts framework aJtogether."). 
30. Dale, 530 U.S. at 643-44. 
31. Id. at 644. The statute here at issue, New Jersey's public accommodations 
statute, states: 
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all 
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of pub­
lic accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real 
property without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, 
ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, 
or sex, subject only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all 
persons. 
Id. at 663-64 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West 
2000)). 
32. Id. at 649-50. 
33. Id. at 650. 
34. Id. at 652-53. 
35. Id. at 658-59. 
762 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:757 
ogy36 and abruptly concluded, "The state interests embodied in 
New Jersey's public accommodations law do not justify such a se­
vere intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive 
association."37 The Court provided no explanation as to why the 
state's interests did not justify such an intrusion, nor did it address 
whether the state's interests were compelling.38 Moreover, the 
Court did not undertake a balancing test to determine whether the 
state's interest, assuming that it was compelling and unrelated to 
the suppression of ideas, did or did not outweigh the Scouts' inter­
est in freedom of expressive association.39 
2. Expressive Association and Compelled Speech in Hurley 
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston40 
The First Amendment, in addition to restricting suppression of 
speech, prevents the state "from compelling individuals to express 
certain views": that is, the state cannot force someone to say some­
thing that he or she does not want to say.41 Although compelled 
speech is conceptually different from restriction of speech by the 
state, they both interfere with the individual's right to speak his or 
her mind and, therefore, the constitutional analysis for both is 
similar.42 
An important case, which addressed compelled speech of a 
parade organizer and that was heavily relied upon by the Dale 
36. See id.; see also Zahner, supra note 20, at 386-88 ("The Dale analysis did not 
follow the analytical framework laid out in the Roberts trilogy.... [It] departed from 
the second part of the Roberts framework altogether."). 
37. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. 
38. See id. at 658-59; see also Zahner, supra note 20, at 386-88. 
39. Zahner, supra note 20, at 387-88. 
40. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 
557 (1995). 
41. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (citing Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943». 
42. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. The Court has articulated three types of compelled 
speech that are prohibited by the First Amendment. FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 
235-36 (3d Cir. 2004). The first is "government action that forces a private speaker to 
propagate a particular message." Id. at 236 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; Wooley, 
430 U.S. at 717). The second is when the state forces a private individual to accept 
another private individual's viewpoint via a government regulation or statute. Id. (cit­
ing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 
12-16 (1986». Government action that coerces an individual to subsidize or fund an 
organization that engages in speech that the individual disagrees with makes up the 
third category. Id. (citing United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 413). 
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opinion, is Hurley.43 The Court in Dale noted that the Hurley opin­
ion did not explicitly deem the parade an expressive association; 
nevertheless, the Court found the analysis used in Hurley to be ap­
plicable in Dale.44 In Hurley, the state's public accommodations 
law forced organizers of Boston's Saint Patrick's Day Parade to al­
low the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos­
ton (GLIB, to march in the parade behind a banner that openly 
identified the group.45 The parade organizers argued that forcing 
them to include GLIB would violate their First Amendment 
rights.46 The Hurley Court found that parades are forms of expres­
sion, and noted that the "Constitution looks beyond written or spo­
ken words as mediums of expression."47 The Court held that the 
state antidiscrimination law cannot force organizers of the parade 
to include members who communicate a message that the or­
ganizers do not desire to express.48 The Court acknowledged that 
the state is allowed to promulgate a law that promotes beneficial 
conduct in order to displace "harmful behavior," but it may not "in­
terfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an ap­
proved message or discouraging a disfavored one."49 
3. Expressive Association of Student Groups in Healy 
v. James 
In Healy v. James ,50 a group of students attending Central Con­
necticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution, sought 
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS).51 CCSC's president denied the students' request, and did 
not afford the SDS official campus recognition. 52 The president jus­
tified his decision on the premise that the local SDS chapter had, at 
a minimum, a loose affiliation with the national SDS organization, 
and therefore, based on the published philosophy of the SDS,53 the 
43. Hurley, 515 U.S. 557. 
44. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. 
45. Zahner, supra note 20, at 378 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561-66). 
46. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 563. 
47. Id. at 568-69. 
48. Zahner, supra note 20, at 378 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559). 
49. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579. 
50. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
51. Id. at 170-71. 
52. Id. at 174-76. 
53. During the early part of the 1970s a climate of unrest and civil disobedience 
was prevalent among many college campuses. Id. at 170-71 (citing REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST (1970); REPORT OF THE AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT DISSENT 
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local chapter would be in violation of CCSC's approved conduct 
policy,54 which governed student groups and condemned disruptive 
behavior.55 
In response, the local SDS, consisting of CCSC students, filed 
suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive re­
lief; its primary complaint alleged that CCSC infringed on its First 
Amendment right of association by denying it recognition.56 In its 
holding in favor of the student group, the Supreme Court noted, 
"There can be no doubt that the denial of official recognition, with­
out justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges that 
associational right. "57 The Court stated that there is a potentially 
acceptable ground for denying the SDS official campus recognition 
regardless of its First Amendment associational rights.58 The Court 
explained that a disagreement with a group's philosophy is not 
enough by itself to deny a student group recognition;59 however, 
"[ a ]ssociational activities need not be tolerated where they infringe 
reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere 
with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education."60 
The Court concluded that, in the case at bar, there was insub­
stantial evidence to show that CCSC-SDS posed a threat of "mate­
rial disruption," but if there was such evidence, the refusal to 
recognize the group, notwithstanding its associational claim, would 
be valid.61 Thus, under Healy, a school cannot bar a group from 
associating as a recognized student group as long as the group fol­
(1970». SDS played a part in creating this atmosphere, and may have played a role in 
the "seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson." Id. at 171. 
54. The policy, approved by the students and faculty, states: 
Students do not have the right to invade the privacy of others, to damage 
the property of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the 
college, or to interfere with the rights of others.... 
Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus ... [a]re all pre­
cious freedom that that we cherish and are freedom on which we stand. To 
approve any organization or individual who joins with an organization which 
openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those freedoms and to the 
approved "Statement on the Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of Stu­
dents" at Central. 
Healy, 408 U.S. at 174-75 n.4 (citing Brief of Appellant 15-16, Healy, 408 U.S. 169 (No. 
71-452». 
55. Id. at 174-76. 
56. Id. at 177. 
57. Id. at 181. 
58. Id. at 185. 
59. Id. at 187. 
60. Id. at 189. 
61. Id. 
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lows the formalities of recognition, does not pose a threat of mate­
rial interruption to the campus, and no other compelling state 
interest warrants non-recognition.62 
4. 	 Expressive Association and Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. 63 
In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 
Inc., the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 
an association of law schools,64 challenged the constitutionality of 
the Solomon Amendment65 on First Amendment free speech and 
association grounds.66 Law schools that are members of FAIR have 
nondiscrimination policies, and therefore wish to restrict military 
recruiting on their campuses because of the military's policy prohib­
iting homosexuals from joining the Armed Forces.67 The Solomon 
Amendment requires law schools to provide military recruiters ac­
cess equal to that of other recruiters.68 If the schools want to con­
tinue to receive federal funding, they must provide military 
recruiters access to the law school campus if other recruiters are 
allowed on law school grounds.69 According to FAIR, the Solomon 
Amendment was unconstitutional because it forced schools to 
choose between exercising their First Amendment expressive rights 
or accommodating the military's message and thereby ensuring fed­
eral funding.70 
62. See Mark Andrew Snider, Note, Viewpoint Discrimination By Public Univer­
sities: Student Religious Organizations and Violations of University Nondiscrimination 
Policies, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 852 (2004). 
63. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 
(2006) [hereinafter "Rumsfeld v. FAIR" or FAIR]. 
64. FAIR's purpose is to "promote academic freedom, support educational insti­
tutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate the rights of institutions of higher edu­
cation." Id. at 1302. 
65. 10 U.S.c. § 983 (2000). In 1994, New York Representative Gerald Solomon 
sponsored an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1995. Pub. L. No. 103-337 § 558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994). The Amendment was 
thereafter dubbed the "Solomon Amendment." Deborah F. Buckman, Validity, Con­
struction, and Application of the Solomon Amendment, Which Denies Federal Funding 
to Institutions of Higher Education that Prohibit Military Representatives Access to and 
Assistance for Recruiting Purposes,S A.L.R. Fed. 2d 551, 558 & n.4 (2005). 
66. 	 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1303. 
67. Id. at 1302 & n.1. The military's policy, adopted by Congress, generally pre­
vents a person from joining the Armed Forces if he or she has "engaged in homosexual 
acts, stated that he [or she] is a homosexual, or married a person of the same sex." Id. 
at 1302 n.1. 
68. 	 Id. at 1302. 
69. 	 Id. at 1303. 
70. 	 Id. 
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The Third Circuit held that conditioning the funds was uncon­
stitutional for essentially three reasons.71 First, under the Amend­
ment, in order to accommodate military recruiters as they do other 
recruiters, the law schools would need to send out e-mails and dis­
tribute flyers in order to announce that the military recruiters were 
on campus to conduct interviewsJ2 The Third Circuit viewed this 
as in effect compelling the schools to convey the government's mes­
sage.73 Second, requiring law schools to host military recruiters on 
campus unconstitutionally forced law schools to accommodate the 
military's anti-homosexual messageJ4 Third, the Solomon Amend­
ment, even if read only to regulate conduct, would nonetheless vio­
late the schools' right to engage in expressive conductJ5 
The Supreme Court rejected all three of these positions. First, 
the Court agreed that freedom of speech prevents the government 
from compelling groups to say something that they do not wish to 
sayJ6 The Court gave examples like forcing schoolchildren to re­
cite the Pledge of Allegiance and forcing New Hampshire motorists 
to display "Live Free or Die" on their license piatesJ7 However, 
with regard to the law schools, the Court viewed the allegedly 
forced recruiting assistance (sending out informational e-mails and 
flyers regarding military recruiters) as "a far cry from the compelled 
speech" present in the aforementioned examplesJ8 Moreover, the 
Court described the compelled speech present in FAIR as merely 
incidental to the regulation of conductJ9 
Next, the Court acknowledged that it has limited the govern­
ment's ability to "force one speaker to host or accommodate an­
other speaker's message."80 However, in this case, the Court 
opined that accommodating the military's message would not affect 
the schools' speech because hosting interviews and allowing 
recruiters on campus is not speech per se.81 The Court stated that, 
considering that high school students can "appreciate the difference 





76. Id. at 1308. 
77. Id. at 1307 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
78. Id. at 1308. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 1309 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of 
Boston. Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995)). 
81. Id. at 1309-10. 
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between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits 
because [they are] legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal 
access policy," then "[s]urely students have not lost that ability by 
the time they get to law school."82 
The Court then examined the schools' expressive association 
claims. FAIR argued that the law schools' ability to express their 
message-that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is 
wrong-was substantially affected by forcing them to allow and as­
sist military recruiters on campus.83 FAIR relied heavily on DaLe in 
making this argument.84 The Court disagreed with FAIR's reason­
ing, stating that the critical distinction between this case and DaLe 
was that the Solomon Amendment did not force the school to ac­
cept members, because recruiters were not part of the law school; 
they were outsiders who use the campus for a limited time and for a 
limited purpose.85 Moreover, the Court rejected the idea that 
FAIR was engaging in symbolic speech by selecting which 
recruiters the school allowed on campus.86 In addition, the Court 
said that, if they wished, the law school and its faculty and students, 
under the Amendment, were free to "voice their disapproval of the 
military's message" in a number of alternative waysP 
The Court summed up its review of FAIR's free speech claims 
by opining that the law schools plainly overstated the expressive 
nature of their activity, and that the Solomon Amendment's impact 
on their expressive activity was not substantia1.88 Thus, the Court 
rejected the Third Circuit's conclusion that the Solomon Amend­
ment violated the schools' freedom of speech.89 In the end, the 
Court suggested that Congress could have forced the schools to 
82. Id. at 1310 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 
226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion)). 
83. /d. at 1312. 
84. Id. at 1308. 
85. Id. at 1312. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1313. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. The Court stated that "[a]lthough Congress has broad authority to legis­
late on matters of military recruiting, it nonetheless chose to secure campus access for 
military recruiters indirectly, through its Spending Clause power." Id. at 1306. The 
Court went on to state that because "Congress could require law schools to provide 
equal access to military recruiters without violating the schools' freedoms of speech or 
association," the lower court erred in holding that the Solomon Amendment violated 
the First Amendment. Id. at 1313. The thrust of the opinion was that Congress could 
have used more pervasive means to force open the schools' doors to military recruiters, 
but chose instead to condition funding upon granting access. Id. In light of this, the 
schools' First Amendment claims were not persuasive. See id. 
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open their doors to recruiters unconditionally instead of using the 
spending power to condition funding upon schools opening their 
doors.9o 
B. Viewpoint Discrimination 
Government regulation of speech based on the viewpoint or 
content of that speech is unconstitutiona1.91 However, depending 
on the speech's forum,92 the government may in some circum­
stances restrict speech and expressive activities.93 Expressive activ­
ity may be banned because the activity is itself harmful, but not 
because of the idea it portrays.94 For example, assaulting a person 
90. Id. at 1306, 1313 (stating that "Congress has broad authority to legislate on 
matters of military recruiting," and "[b]ecause Congress could require law schools to 
provide equal access to military recruiters without violating the schools' freedoms of 
speech or association, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Solomon Amend­
ment likely violates the First Amendment"). 
91. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 458 (1998) (citing Consol. Edison Co. 
of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980)). 
92. The Court has recognized three types of fora to help determine whether re­
strictions on speech are permissible: the traditional public forum, the designated public 
forum, and the non public forum. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 
460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
93. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981). In Widmar, the recog­
nized student organization, Cornerstone, was informed that it could no longer use Uni­
versity buildings for meeting space. Id. at 265. Students, all members of the group, 
filed suit to challenge the restriction, claiming that the policy, which the University 
promulgated, "violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and 
freedom of speech." Id. at 266. In its opinion, the Court first stated that the University, 
by accommodating student groups to engage in expression, created a public forum. Id. 
at 267. Next, the Court noted that in order for the University to exclude a group from 
such a public forum based on the content of the group's speech, it must show that the 
regulation was necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it was narrowly 
drawn. Id. 269-70 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 464-65 (1980)). The Uni­
versity argued that it had a compelling interest in not violating the Establishment 
Clause, and that allowing religious student groups to use the University's facilities 
would violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 270-71. The Court disagreed. [d. at 273. 
Thereafter, the Court refocused the issue to whether the University may "exclude 
groups because of the content of their speech." Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 
(1972)). The Court answered the question in the negative, and found in favor of the 
student group, stating that the University's "exclusionary policy violates the fundamen­
tal principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral." Id. at 277. 
What is more, in dicta, the Court re-affirmed Healy, stating, "[W]e affirm the continu­
ing validity of cases ... that recognize a university's right to exclude even First Amend­
ment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the 
opportunity of other students to obtain an education." Id. (internal citation omitted) 
(citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)). 
94. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992). In R.A. V., the petitioner 
challenged a St. Paul ordinance that prohibited the use of "fighting words," which were 
considered particularly offensive, and showed" 'bias-motivated' hatred." Id. at 380, 
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based on his or her race is not an act that is entitled to constitu­
tional protection.95 The government may regulate the harmful act, 
but it may not aim to suppress the racist idea underlying that act.96 
Therefore, if a group exercising its right of expressive association is 
suppressed by the state primarily because of its viewpoint, such ac­
tion would be a violation of the First Amendment. 
The Court has recognized three types of fora to help determine 
whether restrictions on speech are permissible.97 The Court uses 
this "forum analysis" to determine whether "the Government's in­
terest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose, [i.e., 
restrictions on speech] outweighs the interest[s] of those wishing to 
use the property for other purposes."98 The three types of fora are 
the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the 
nonpublic forum.99 
The traditional public forum includes places that have been de­
voted to public "assembly and debate" by the government, or 
places that have traditionally been viewed as places of public "as­
392. A group of teenagers made a crude cross from pieces of a wooden chair and alleg­
edly burned the cross on the yard of a black family before sunrise early one morning. 
Id. at 380. The conduct was prosecuted under a municipal ordinance. Id. at 379. In a 
later case, the Court struck down the St. Paul ordinance, because it was "explicitly di­
rected at expression." Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993). In his opinion in 
R.A. V., Justice Scalia stated that certain types of regulations fall within exceptions to 
the First Amendment prohibition against suppression of speech, and therefore should 
be tolerated. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382, 393. Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]e have long held 
... that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but 
not because of the ideas it expresses." Id. at 385. Moreover, a regulation that prohib­
ited burning of the flag because it was a fire risk would not be repugnant to the First 
Amendment. Id. Conversely, such a regulation would infringe upon the First Amend­
ment if the regulation prohibited burning the flag because it was viewed as dishonora­
ble. Id. The Court acknowledged that "[w]here the government does not target 
conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation 
merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy." Id. at 390. 
95. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U.S. 886,916 (1982». In Mitchell, the defendant was convicted for aggravated battery. 
Id. at 480. Since Mitchell (an African-American) intentionally selected his victim (a 
Caucasian boy) on account of his race, Mitchell's sentence was enhanced pursuant to 
Wisconsin's penalty-enhancement statute. /d. Mitchell challenged the sentencing en­
hancement on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 481. The Court struck down Mitchell's 
claim and asserted that not all conduct that is intended to express an idea can be labeled 
"speech." Id. at 484. The Court did not consider the assault expressive conduct pro­
tected by the First Amendment and noted, "potentially expressive activities that pro­
duce special harms distinct from their communicative impact ... are entitled to no 
constitutional protection." Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
98. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
99. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46. 
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sembly and debate."loo Examples of traditional public fora are 
streets, parks, and public squares. lOl The second category-desig­
nated public forum-consists of places where the government 
grants the public access for expressive purposes, even though it has 
not done so traditionally, and it is not required to do SO.102 Local 
elementary schools, university buildings, and municipal theatres are 
examples of designated public forums.Io3 The third forum, which is 
of no consequence here, is the nonpublic forum, and it involves 
places not open for use by the general public.I04 
In order for the state to regulate speech in the traditional pub­
lic forum, the regulation must be "necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest," and it must be "narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end."105 Restrictions on speech within the designated public forum, 
which include schools and universities, are subject to the same stan­
dards as the traditional public forum.Io6 Once the state has opened 
the school or other forum to the public, the First Amendment pro­
hibits the state from excluding certain individuals even though the 
state was not obliged to open the forum in the first place.lo7 How­
ever, the government may constitutionally limit the forum from its 
inception, thus creating a designated public forum for a limited or 
100. Id. at 45. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 108 (2001) (finding 
that the school district created a limited public forum by allowing access to public 
school buildings to the community); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (find­
ing that granting access to university buildings for meetings created a public forum); Se. 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,555 (1975) (finding a public forum in a state 
auditorium and theatre that were set aside for expressive activities). 
104. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46-47. Examples of nonpublic forums 
include jails, military bases, advertising rental space on a city's transit system, and inter­
school message delivery systems for teachers at a public school. Adderly v. Florida, 385 
U.S. 39, 41 (1966) (jail considered a nonpublic forum); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 
(interschool mail system for teachers considered a nonpublic forum); Greer v. Spock, 
424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (military base not found to be a public forum); Lehman v. City 
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,301-02 (1974) (city's public transit system not consid­
ered a public forum). 
105. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. Moreover, the government may make 
"time, place and manner" restrictions that are "content-neutral" and "are narrowly tai­
lored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative chan­
nels of communication." Id. (citing U.S. Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic 
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 
530,535-36 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972); Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939». 
106. /d. at 45-46. 
107. Id. at 45 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. 263). 
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exclusive purpose such as use by only certain groups, or for the dis­
cussion of particular subjects. lOs 
C. UnconstitutionaL Conditions Doctrine 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, generally speaking, 
"prohibits conditions on allocations in which the government indi­
rectly impinges on a protected activity or choice in a way that would 
be unconstitutional if the same result had been achieved through a 
direct governmental command."109 With regard to speech, the gen­
eral rule is that the government "may not deny a benefit to a person 
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests­
especially, his interest in freedom of speech."110 To be sure, if the 
government could condition benefits in such a way, it would be tan­
tamount to producing a result that the government could not de­
mand directly.111 
This indirect interference with constitutional rights is rarely up­
held.112 Nevertheless, some restrictions on speech and association 
are permissible so long as the government does not "discriminate 
invidiously" by aiming "at the suppression of dangerous ideas."113 
The constitutionality of a benefit conditioned upon a constitutional 
right is usually determined case by case.114 Yet, broadly stated, con­
ditioning of governmental benefits is constitutional if it is "view­
point neutral" and "reasonable. "115 For example, the Supreme 
Court has recently restated that "Congress is free to attach reasona­
ble and unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that 
108. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. 263; City of 
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) 
(school board meeting)). 
109. Jennifer Levi, Probation Restrictions Impacting the Right to Procreate: The 
Oakley Error, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 81, 104 (2004) (citing Lynn A. Baker, The 
Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1185,1193-94 (1990)). 
110. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 u.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
111. Id. (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
112. See id. 
113. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Regan 
v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)). 
114. Deborah Kelly, Note, The Legal Services Corporation's Solicitation Restric­
tion and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Has the Death Knell Sounded for 
Future Challenges to the Restriction?, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 247, 275 n.191 (2004). 
115. Wyman, 335 F.3d at 92 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (holding that restrictions on access to nonpublic 
forums must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable); Regan, 461 U.S. at 550). 
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educational institutions are not obligated to accept."1l6 Also, 
"'when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a 
program it is entitled to define the limits of that program."'l17 




A. Christian Legal Society and its Student Chapters 
The CLS is "a nationwide association of Christian lawyers, law 
students, law professors, and judges."118 Its purpose is to 
"promot[ e] justice, religious liberty, and biblical conflict resolution; 
[to] encourag[e] disciplin[e] and aid[] Christian law students; and 
[to] encourag[ e] Christian lawyers to [provide] legal services to the 
poor."119 In order to gain admission, prospective members must 
sign a Statement of Faith120 and adhere to and live their life in a 
manner consistent with orthodox Christian beliefs.121 In light of the 
CLS's orthodox Christian viewpoints, the organization has inter­
preted its Statement of Faith as prohibiting homosexuals and non­
Christians from becoming members or officers of the group.122 
Moreover, the CLS will not allow heterosexual Christians to be­
come members or serve as officers if they believe that homosexual 
conduct is not sinfup23 On the other hand, a person who has en­
116. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306 (2006) (quoting Grove City Coli. v. 
Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984)). 
117. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194,211 (2003) (quoting 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
118. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Calif. v. Kane, No. C 04-4484 JSW, 
2005 WL 850864, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12,2005) (citing Plaintiff's Complaint, 'll 3.1.). 
119. Id. 
120. The Statement of Faith states: 

Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in: 

• One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
• God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth. 
• The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's only Son conceived of the Holy 
Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which 
we receive eternal life; His bodily resurrection and personal return. 
• The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration. 
• The Bible as the inspired Word of God. 
Christian Legal Soc'y Ch. of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-4484 JSW, 2006 WL 
997217, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006) (citing the bylaws of the Christian Legal 
Society). 
121. Kane, 2005 WL 850864, at *1 (citing Plaintiff's Complaint, 'll'll 3.7-3.8). The 
CLS construes orthodox Christian viewpoints as prohibiting sexual conduct between 
persons of the same sex. Id. 
122. Kane, 2006 WL 997217, at *3. 
123. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 868 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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gaged in homosexual conduct but has repented for such conduct, or 
a person who may have homosexual tendencies, but does not en­
gage in homosexual activity, may become a member and serve as an 
officer of the CLS.124 
The CLS has student chapters at most law schools across the 
country.125 As a recognized student organization, CLS chapters en­
joy particular benefits and privileges, such as access to storage 
space, bulletin boards, and meeting space; recognition on the law 
school's website; eligibility for funding; and use of the school's 
name.126 In order for a student organization to enjoy recognized 
status, it must cooperate with the school's nondiscrimination 
policies.127 
Based on the CLS's Statement of Faith and the basic nature of 
the group, the CLS is a group that engages in expressive associa­
tion.128 Therefore, the freedoms of expressive association, religion, 
and speech, outlined above, are crucial to the CLS's survival. 
B. The Law Schools' Nondiscrimination Policies 
Law schools have historically maintained formal nondiscrimi­
nation policies that prohibited discrimination based on race, gen­
der, and religion.129 During the 1970s, some schools began to 
include sexual orientation among the protected classes.13o The As­
sociation of American Law Schools131 has adopted a policy that for­
124. Id. 
125. Christian Legal Soc'y, Law Student Ministries Main Page, http://www.clsnet. 
org!lsmPages/index.phpx (last visited May 14, 2007). 
126. Walker, 453 F.3d at 857-58; Kane, 2005 WL 850864, at *1; Joint Statement of 
Undisputed Facts <J[ 40, Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at Ariz. State Univ. ColI. of Law 
v. Crow, No. CV-04-2572-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz., Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Crow, 
JSOF]. 
127. Walker, 453 F.3d at 857-58; Kane, 2005 WL 850864, at *1; PI.'s V. Compl., 
Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at Ariz. State Univ. Coll. of Law v. Crow, No. CV-04­
2572-PHX-NVW, 'Il'lI 4.3, 4.5, 4.9 (D. Ariz. Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Crow, Pl.'s V. 
Campi.]. 
128. Walker, 453 F.3d at 862 ("It would be hard to argue-and no one does-that 
CLS is not an expressive association."); see also Hansen, supra note 4, at 12. 
129. FAIR v. Rum~feld, 390 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd, 547 U.S. 47 
(2006). 
130. Id. at 224-25. 
131. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS), founded in 1900 with 
thirty-two charter members, is an association that includes one hundred sixty-six "Mem­
ber Schools," and twenty-five non-member, fee-paid schools, and is based in Washing­
ton, D.C. Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., About the AALS: What is the AALS?, http://www. 
aals.org!about.php (last visited May 14, 2007); Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., AALS Member 
Schools, http://www.aals.org!about_memberschools.php (last visited May 14, 2007); 
Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Bylaws of the Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Inc., Art. 1, § 1-2 
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bids discrimination or segregation on the ground of, among other 
things, sexual orientation.132 The schools involved in the current 
litigation have nondiscrimination policies that are all similar; they 
essentially proscribe student organizations from discriminating on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, 
status as a disabled veteran, sexual orientation, or marital status.133 
Recently, schools have been unwilling to recognize CLS stu­
dent chapters based on the student chapters' interpretation of the 
statement of faith.134 Arizona State University College of Law, 
Southern Illinois University School of Law at Carbondale, and Has­
(adopted Dec. 29, 1971; amended through Jan. 3,2004) [hereinafter "Bylaws"], availa­
ble at http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_bylaws.php. The AALS's purpose is to 
"improve[] the legal profession through legal education." Bylaws, supra. 
132. Bylaws, supra note 131, Art. 6, § 6-3. Section 6-3 states: 
A member school shall provide equality of opportunity in legal education for 
all persons, including faculty and employees with respect to hiring, continua­
tion, promotion and tenure, applicants for admission, enrolled students, and 
graduates, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color 
religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation. 
Id. 
133. Southern Illinois University's Affirmative Action Policy states: "'It is the 
policy of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale to provide equal employment and 
education opportunities for all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, age, disability, status as a disabled veteran or a veteran of the Viet­
nam era, sexual orientation, or marital status.'" Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, No. 
Civ. 05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2005) (quoting the Joint 
Stipulation of Facts for Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, 'll 15). The University's 
Board of Trustees Policy states: "'No student constituency body or recognized student 
organization shall be authorized unless it adheres to all appropriate federal or state laws 
concerning nondiscrimination and equal opportunity.'" Id. (quoting the Southern Illi­
nois University Board of Trustees Policy). Hastings College of Law's nondiscrimination 
policy provides: 
The College is committed to a policy against legally impermissible, arbitrary or 
unreasonable discriminatory practices. All groups, including administration, 
faculty, student governments, College-owned student residence facilities and 
programs sponsored by the College, are governed by this policy of nondiscrim­
ination . . .. The University of California, Hastings College of the Law shall 
not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, 
ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation. This nondiscrimination pol­
icy covers admission, access and treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs 
and activities. 
Order Granting in Part & Denying in Part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at 2-3, 
Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Calif. Hastings Coil. of Law v. Kane, No. C 
04-04484 JSW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12,2005) [hereinafter Kane, Order]. The Arizona State 
University College of Law University Student Code of Conduct, which applies to stu­
dent organizations, prohibits "[e]ngaging in discriminatory activities, whether unlawful 
or whether prohibited by university policy, on the basis of age, ethnicity, gender, disa­
bility, color, national origin, race, religion, sexual orientation, or veteran status." Crow, 
Pl.'s V. Compl., supra note 127, at 10. 
134. Hansen, supra note 4, at 12; Montini, supra note 2. 
• 
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tings College of Law have revoked or refused to recognize the 
CLS's student chapters' status as a recognized student organiza­
tion.135 The schools have refused to recognize the student organiza­
tions because the CLS's refusal to allow homosexuals and non­
Christians to join as members or officers is a violation of the 
schools' nondiscrimination policies.136 The schools claim that the 
nondiscrimination policies apply to all student organizations seek­
ing recognized status regardless of their message.l37 Moreover, the 
law schools argue that they do not wish to reach out and enforce 
their laws or policies upon the CLS; rather, the CLS has come to 
the schools and asked for the schools' "imprimatur and certain ben­
efits."138 The schools' goal in promulgating nondiscrimination poli­
cies is to "help further its chosen values of inclusion and 
diversity."139 The public law schools encourage a diversity of view­
points and permit students to organize in groups and associations of 
common interest.14o 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
A. The CLS's Expressive Association Claim 
None of the Court's expressive association decisions squarely 
address the issues present in the current CLS litigation.141 Never­
theless, an examination of relevant First Amendment cases, namely, 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,142 Rumsfeld v. FAIR,143 and Healy 
v. James 144 are integral to a court's analysis of the pending CLS 
cases. 
135. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006); Christian 
Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-4484 JSW, 2005 WL 850864, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 
2005); Crow, Pl.'s V. Compl., supra note 127, 'lI'll 4.3,4.5,4.9. 
136. Walker, 453 F.3d at 858; Kane, 2005 WL 850864, at *1; Crow, PI. 's V. 
Compl., supra note 127, 'lI'll 3.2, 4.3, 4.9. 
137. See Def.'s Response to Pl.'s Motion for Summ. J. & for Declaratory & Per­
manent Injunctive Relief & Mem. of Points & Authorities; and Def.'s Cross Motion for 
Summ. J. on All Remaining Claims, Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at ASU v. Crow, 
No. CV-04-2572-PHX-NVW, 3:1-8 (D. Ariz. filed Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Crow, 
Def's Response to PI. 's Motion for Summ. 1.]. 
138. Id. at 1-2. 
139. Id. at 3. 
140. See Crow, lSOF, supra note 126, at 5:13-15. 
141. See Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public Universities Antidis­
crimination Policies and Religious Student Organizations, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2882, 2883 
(2005). 
142. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
143. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
144. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
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1. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
Under Dale, in order for the CLS's expressive assocIatIOn 
claim to succeed, the CLS must first show that it engages in expres­
sive association.145 Second, it must show that the law schools' non­
discrimination policies significantly affect the CLS's ability to 
advocate its viewpoints.146 Third, it must show that the law schools' 
interests do not outweigh the burden imposed on the CLS's right of 
expressive association.147 The CLS claims are weak in light of the 
second and third prongs of the test employed in Dale .148 
As mentioned above, in order to qualify as an association wor­
thy of constitutional protection, the "group must engage in some 
form of expression."149 This standard protects more than just advo­
cacy groups.150 The Healy Court recognized that student groups 
deserve First Amendment protection as expressive associations.151 
Therefore, the CLS, being a student group, satisfies the first 
condition. 
The second factor under Dale's expressive association analysis 
requires the CLS to show that forcing it to accept an unwanted 
memberI52 would undermine, or "significantly affect the [CLS's] 
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. "153 In Dale, the 
Court needed to dig a little to ascertain the Boy Scouts' position on 
homosexuality.154 In contrast, the CLS clearly denounces 
homosexuality.155 
145. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 648-49); see also supra text accompanying notes 17­
39. 
146. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc., 229 F.3d at 442 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 650); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 17-39. 
147. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc., 229 F.3d at 442 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 656­
58). 
148. See generally supra text accompanying notes 17-39. 
149. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; see supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
150. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
151. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972). 
152. An unwanted member being, for example, one who is a homosexual, does 
not believe that homosexuality is a sin, or does not believe in Orthodox Christian views. 
See generally Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 
Civ. 05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2005). 
153. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650. 
154. See id. at 653-55; see also Walker, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1 (stating that the 
CLS does not approve of homosexuality). 
155. See Hansen, supra note 4 (stating that the CLS believes that sexual conduct 
between members of the same sex is sinful). 
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Although the Boy Scouts' position on the issue of homosexual­
ity was not absolutely clear,156 the Dale Court nonetheless stated 
that James Dale's presence in the organization "would, at the very 
least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth 
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual 
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."157 Because the Court 
found that including James Dale as a member would significantly 
affect the Scouts' ability to project its viewpoint, it seems logical 
that a court analyzing the CLS's claim would find that including a 
homosexual would similarly inhibit the CLS's ability to express its 
viewpoints. But, because the opinion in Dale is distinctly fact spe­
cific, the second factor in the current controversy, under the Dale 
analysis, is not necessarily satisfied. 
In Dale, the Court dealt with the "forced inclusion of an un­
wanted person."158 In the CLS litigation, the CLS is not com­
plaining of a specific homosexual student seeking inclusion,159 and, 
the law schools are not directly forcing the CLS to accept members 
it wishes to exclude.160 In Dale, the Court was unwilling to apply 
New Jersey's public accommodations law, which would have forced 
the Boy Scouts to accept James Dale as a member.l61 Much of the 
opinion's focus regarded whether the inclusion of an individual, 
James Dale, would significantly affect the Boy Scouts' message.162 
The Court emphasized that James Dale was active in the local 
gay rights movement and community.163 While attending Rutgers 
University, Dale was co-president of the Rutgers University Les­
bian/Gay Alliance. l64 The Court noted that he was a scout who was 
156. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 649-53. The Dale Court examined the Boy Scouts' 
"Scout Oath" and found that the Scouts' general mission was to "'instill values in young 
people.'" Id. at 649 (citing the Boy Scouts' "Scout Oath"). The Court looked beyond 
the Oath to determine the Scouts' position on homosexuality and found, via the Scouts' 
brief and a 1978 "position statement" signed by the president of the Boy Scouts, that 
the Scouts' position was and is that homosexual behavior and conduct is antithetical to 
the Scouts' teachings and, therefore, their expression. Id. at 650-52. 
157. Id. at 653. 
158. [d. at 648. 
159. See generally Walker, 2005 WL 2840229, at *1. In Walker, the court noted, 
"The CLS ... admits that an individual or individuals complained to SIU law school 
officials about the CLS's discriminatory policy and/or practices." Id. This is compared 
to the case in Dale, where an individual who was actively seeking membership in the 
group was denied because of his homosexuality. 
160. Cf Dale, 530 U.S. at 644. 
161. [d. at 658-59. 
162. See id. at 653. 
163. [d. at 643-44. 
164. [d. at 645. 
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openly gay and a leader in the local gay community.165 Moreover, 
the Court noted that James Dale was interviewed by a local news­
paper about his "advocacy of homosexual teenagers' need for gay 
role models."166 Therefore, the Court's assertion that the mere 
presence of James Dale would send a message to the world that the 
Boy Scouts accept homosexual behavior as legitimateI67 was based 
not simply on Dale's identity as a homosexual, but significantly, on 
his status as an active gay rights leader.168 
The emphasis on James Dale's status as a gay rights activist 
suggests that if Dale was not engaged in activism, the Court would 
not necessarily have found that Dale's presence would affect the 
"group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints."169 This is 
corroborated by the Court's distinction between someone who is 
opposed to discrimination against homosexuals, and someone who 
is a homosexual and a gay rights activist.170 The Court stated that 
"[t]he presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in 
an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different mes­
sage from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who 
is on record as disagreeing with [the] Boy Scouts' policy."171 
Another problem with the applicability of Dale is that the 
breadth of the holding is unclear. In fact, debate exists amongst 
courts as to how Dale should be interpreted. l72 Specifically, two 
issues arise.173 The first is whether Dale should be read to allow 
groups to exclude "all avowed homosexuals, or only homosexuals 
who publicly voice a viewpoint" that is adverse to the groups' in­
tended message or positionP4 The second issue is whether Dale 
should be read to allow associations to exclude homosexuals (re­
gardless of their public openness) from all positions within the 
group, or only leadership positions.175 At least two decisions have 
opined that a homosexual's public activism is pertinent to whether 
165. Id. at 653. 
166. Id. at 645. 
167. Id. at 653. 
168. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Dale, 
530 u.S. 640). 
169. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 
U.S. 1, 13 (1988»; see also id. at 653-56. 
170. Id. at 655-56. 
171. Id. 
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an association may exclude him or her.176 Given the emphasis in 
the Dale opinion about James Dale's role in the gay community, it 
is likely that the inclusion of a homosexual who is not as public 
about his or her sexual orientation as James Dale was, would not 
significantly burden the group's ability to express its viewpoints. 
Therefore, in the current controversy, the lack of a tangible "James 
Dale" student to some extent undercuts Dale's application to the 
CLS cases. 
The CLS interprets its statement of faith to prohibit a student 
who does not believe that homosexual conduct is sinful from be­
coming a member of the CLSp7 However, it is not necessarily true 
that a student, especially one who is heterosexual, who does not 
believe that homosexuality is sinful, would "force the [CLS] to send 
a message" that it did not want to serid simply because of his or her 
status as a member of the CLS.178 In fact, Dale warns that although 
the court must give deference to what the association thinks would 
impair its expression, "[t]hat is not to say that an expressive associa­
tion can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by as­
serting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group 
would impair its message."179 For example, if a homosexual was 
interested in joining the CLS, admission of that person would not 
change the CLS's ability to preach its message, via group meetings 
and events, publications, and the like, that it views homosexuality 
as unacceptable.180 Taking into account the overall circumstances 
involved in the dispute between the CLS and the law schools, the 
second factor is not wholly satisfied as it was in Dale. 
Even if the CLS can satisfy the second factor under Dale, it 
must then show that the law schools' interests in preventing dis­
crimination on campus does not justify the burden placed upon the 
CLS's expressive activities.181 In Dale, New Jersey's interest was 
176. Id. (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 809 A.2d 
1192, 1201-03 (D.C. 2002) (noting that the Dale Court found it legally significant that 
the terms "avowed homosexual" and "gay activist" were paired together); Chi. Area 
Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. City of Chi. Comm'n on Human Relations, 748 N.E.2d 
759,767 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (the court emphasized that the complainant, as in Dale, was 
a gay rights advocate)). 
177.. Crow, Pl. 's V. Comp/., supra note 127, 'll 3.8. 
178. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,653 (2000). 
179. Id. 
180. If the law schools attempted to prohibit the CLS from disseminating its view 
that homosexuality is unacceptable, it would then be engaging in viewpoint discrimina­
tion, which would be an unconstitutional suppression of speech. See supra Part I.B. 
181. Dale, 530 U.S. at 657-59. 
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ending discrimination.182 Dale applied strict scrutiny to the New 
Jersey law.183 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[t]he state 
interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations law do 
not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to free­
dom of expressive association. "184 
One could imagine a court on auto-pilot coming to a similar 
conclusion in the CLS litigation, holding that the schools' nondis­
crimination policies do not justify an intrusion upon the CLS's asso­
ciational freedoms. However, the Dale opinion is conclusory, 
conducts a hasty balancing test, and is ultimately not a great help to 
the CLS litigation.18s It is true that New Jersey's interest in ending 
discrimination in the Dale case is comparable to the law schools' 
interests in the current dispute.186 But the state's public accommo­
dations law and the schools' nondiscrimination policies operate 
much differently.187 As a result, a court adjudicating the CLS's 
claim should not automatically come to the same conclusion as in 
Dale because the nondiscrimination policies' level of intrusion is 
less severe. 
In Dale and the Roberts' trilogy, individuals sought enforce­
ment of state public accommodations laws, which unconditionally 
required groups to accept individuals that they did not want as 
182. Id. at 647. 
183. Patrick J. Smith, Note, Solomon's Mines: The Explosion Over On-Campus 
Military Recruiting and Why the Solomon Amendment Trumps Law School Non-Dis­
crimination Policies, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 689, 728 (2005). The Supreme Court has 
articulated three levels of analysis in expressional jurisprudence. See Pi Lambda Phi 
Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 445 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing the 
three levels of review as employed by the Supreme Court). The first level, applied in 
Dale, Roberts, and Duarte, is strict scrutiny. Id. at 445-46. Strict scrutiny, the most 
rigorous standard, applies "when the state action directly burdens expressive rights." 
Id. at 446. In those cases, "because the state action directly affected the groups' associ­
ational abilities," the Court required that the state "show a compelling interest that 
justified the burden on the groups' expression" in order for the state action to survive 
an expressive association claim. Id. (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 657-58; Bd. of Dirs. of 
Rotary InCI v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 638 (1984». 
184. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. 
185. See Zahner, supra note 20, at 386-88. 
186. "State public accommodations laws were originally enacted to prevent dis­
crimination in traditional places of public accommodations," and subsequently have 
been expanded. Dale, 530 U.S. at 656 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bi­
sexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,571-72 (1995); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
627-29 (1996». 
187. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of S. Ill. v. Walker, No. Civ. 05­
4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2005) (stating that the issue in Dale 
was not the same as the issue in that case, which concerned access to benefits). 
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members. lss A similar forced inclusion was present in Hurley.ls9 
However, in the current dispute, the CLS is seeking to invalidate 
the nondiscrimination policies in order to receive benefits. In other 
words, the CLS is not being forced to accept members directly; 
rather, it is being forced to refrain from discrimination as a condi­
tion of receiving recognized status from the law schools, along with 
the benefits that come with that status.190 Therefore, Dale and 
Hurley, which dealt with the unconditional forced inclusion of an 
individual or group of individuals, are minimally helpful and cer­
tainly not dispositive in this context, because forced inclusion is a 
significantly greater burden than conditioning benefits upon the re­
linquishment of certain rights.191 
A closer look at Dale shows that the Supreme Court was un­
comfortable with applying a public accommodations law to the Boy 
Scouts, a private group.192 The Court's uneasiness was apparent in 
its opinion, when it described New Jersey's definition of a public 
accommodation as "extremely broad."193 The Court stated: 
[New Jersey's public accommodations] statute includes as places 
of public accommodation taverns, restaurants, retail shops, and 
public libraries. But the statute also includes places that often 
may not carry with them open invitations to the public like sum­
mer camps and roof gardens. In this case, the New Jersey Su­
preme Court went a step further and applied its public 
accommodations law to a private entity without even attempting 
to tie the term "place" to a physical location. As the definition of 
"public accommodation" has expanded from clearly commercial 
entities, such as restaurants, bars and hotels, to membership or­
ganizations such as the Boy Scouts, the potential for conflict be­
tween state public accommodations laws and the First 
Amendment rights of organizations has increased.194 
188. See Dale, 530 U.S. 640; N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 
(1988); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'I v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
189. See supra Part I.A.2; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1995). 
190. See generally Walker, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1. 
191. See infra notes 197 & 205 and accompanying text. 
192. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 656-67 (the Court described that states designed public 
accommodation laws to prevent discrimination in traditionally public settings and re­
cently has extended places of public accommodations beyond the original intent of the 
laws). 
193. Id. at 657. 
194. Id. (citations omitted). 
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Although it may seem, because of the aforementioned lan­
guage, that a court would be unwilling to apply the schools' nondis­
crimination policies to a "membership organization," the law 
schools' nondiscrimination policies are distinguishable from the 
public accommodations laws in Dale.195 The important difference 
operationally between the two regulations is that the public accom­
modations laws force inclusion directly upon private entities, 
whereas the nondiscrimination policies simply place conditions 
upon sought-after benefits.196 
The nondiscrimination policies do not seek out and force their 
way into the inner workings of the group as New Jersey's public 
accommodations law did in Dale.1 97 This operational difference is 
critical. For example, the Second Circuit in Boy Scouts of America 
v. Wyman 198 found that removing the Scouts from the state's work­
place charitable campaign, which provides the Scouts with an op­
portunity to raise funds, was not a direct burden because 
conditioning benefits upon compliance with nondiscriminatory 
practices is not tantamount to compulsion.199 Thus, the Court's ap­
prehension in Dale, which stemmed from applying a broad and in­
trusive public accommodations law to a private group, would be 
unwarranted in the CLS litigation because the schools' nondiscrimi­
nation policies apply only to groups seeking benefits associated 
195. Southern Illinois University's affirmative action policy, supra note 133; Has­
tings College of Law's nondiscrimination policy, supra note 133; Arizona State Univer­
sity College of Law University Student Code of Conduct, supra note 133. 
196. Compare N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1988) (quot­
ing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(2) (1986)) (New York City's Human Rights Law in 
N. Y. State Club Ass'n, which forbade discrimination based on race and creed, among 
other things, in places of public accommodation), with Crow, Del's Response to PI.'s 
Motion for Summ. J., supra note 137, at 6 (stating that "unregistered student groups 
'may, in their decisions or policies relating to membership [and officer positions] ... 
engage in lawful discrimination without discipline or investigation by ASU' "); compare 
also Dale, 530 U.S. at 658-59 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)) 
(holding that the forced inclusion of Dale "directly and immediately affects" the Boy 
Scouts' associational rights and places a "'serious burden'" upon them), with Boy 
Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (removing the Boy Scouts from 
the state's workplace charitable campaign, which provides the Boy Scouts with an op­
portunity for raising charitable funds, was "neither direct nor immediate, since its con­
ditioned exclusion does not rise to the level of compulsion"). 
197. Compare Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 (where the application of the public accom­
modations statute was found to be severely intrusive), with Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) (where the Court held a tax statute constitutional, 
which conditioned benefits upon the compliance of certain nondiscriminatory practices, 
in spite of the substantial impact it would have on the University). 
198. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80. 
199. Id. at 91; see also supra note 194. 
2007] STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS' RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE 783 
with recognized status within the university system. A court should 
be willing to apply such conditions upon groups seeking benefits, 
even under a Dale analysis. 
If New Jersey's public accommodations law had operated like 
the schools' nondiscrimination policies in the CLS litigation, the 
Boy Scouts would not have been directly forced to accept James 
Dale as a member. However, they may have been unable to receive 
special benefits, possibly tax exempt status and so forth, if they re­
fused to accept him as a member.2°O If the New Jersey public ac­
commodations law had operated in such a fashion, the Court's 
opinion, no doubt, would have been materially altered. 
Applying Dale as controlling and dispositive seems logical; 
however, doing so is flawed for several reasons. First, the opinion 
conducts a hasty and conclusory balancing (if one is conducted at 
all) of the state's interest against the group's interest.201 Second, 
unlike in Dale, the current controversy does not present the issue of 
whether a specific avowed gay rights activist will affect the CLS's 
ability to express its viewpoints.202 Moreover, it is unclear whether 
the DaLe opinion only applies to leadership positions or all positions 
within the group.203 Third, New Jersey's public accommodations 
law and the schools' nondiscrimination policies operate and apply 
differently in the two circumstances.204 The law schools' refusal to 
recognize the CLS is not a direct and immediate compulsion as the 
public accommodations law was in Dale.205 Consequently, under 
Dale, the CLS's claim is not necessarily valid.206 
200. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574, 575 (holding that the IRS's revocation of 
the University's tax exempt status based on its racially discriminatory practices did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment). 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39. 
202. See generally supra text accompanying notes 169-199. 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 172-176. 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 188-199. 
205. Compare Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658-59 (2000) (quoting 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984» (holding that the forced inclusion of Dale 
"directly and immediately affects" the Boy Scouts' associational rights and places a 
'''serious burden'" upon them), with Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 91 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (holding that removing the Boy Scouts from the state's workplace charitable 
campaign, which provided the Boy Scouts with an opportunity to raise charitable funds, 
was "neither direct nor immediate, since its conditioned exclusion does not rise to the 
level of compulsion"). 
206. Like Dale, the application of the Court's reasoning in Hurley to the current 
controversies is not very helpful. In Hurley, a member of GLIB wanted to march be­
hind a banner identifying the group in Boston's annual St. Patrick's Day Parade. Hur­
ley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995). In 
Dale, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that in the Hurley case "the parade organizers 
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2. Rumsfeld v. FAIR 
Expressive association, although not the driving force behind 
the Court's opinion in FAIR,207 was nevertheless considered in de­
tail.208 This recent analysis of expressive association is quite helpful 
in understanding the merit of the claims in the CLS litigation. In 
the section of the opinion addressing expressive association, the 
Court found that the controversy in FAIR was distinct from that in 
Dale, and therefore, FAIR's expressive association rights were not 
violated by the Solomon Amendment.209 The Court opined that 
forcing the schools to give access to military recruiters or face losing 
funds was not the same as unconditionally forcing the Boy Scouts to 
accept James Dale, a member it did not want.210 Moreover, the 
Court was not convinced that selectively granting access to 
recruiters based on the recruiters' conformance with the schools' 
nondiscrimination policies was substantially expressive in nature.211 
The Court then briefly mentioned some of its prior expressive asso­
ciation cases, stating that groups have the right to associate for 
did not wish to exclude the GLIB members because of their sexual orientations, but 
because they wanted to march behind a GLIB banner." Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. In the 
Hurley opinion, Justice Souter wrote that marching behind the banner 
would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual, and the presence of the organized marchers would suggest [the or­
ganizers'] view that [homosexuals] ... have as much claim to unqualified social 
acceptance as heterosexuals . . . . The parade's organizers may not believe 
these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, or they may object to unqualified 
social acceptance of gays and lesbians .... 
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-75. Hurley's focus on GLIB's banner suggests that simply in­
cluding a homosexual in a group does not mean that the group therefore must also 
favor unqualified social acceptance of homosexuals. See id. As a result, the forced 
inclusion of a homosexual would not necessarily alter the message of the parade orga­
nizer. Id. However, the forced inclusion of a group, such as GLIB, with an identifying 
banner, or something similar, would likely be perceived by onlookers as acceptance of 
the unintended message. In the controversy between the CLS and the law schools there 
exists no "identifying banner." In other words, the CLS is not being asked to accept 
homosexuals, or gay rights advocates, in order to demonstrate that they accept the ho­
mosexuallifestyle. Rather, the CLS is being asked to accept all students regardless of, 
among other things, sexual orientation. Consequently, the Hurley opinion, although 
noteworthy, is distinguishable on its facts, and therefore, is not controlling. 
207. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
208. Id. at 1311-13. 
209. Id. at 1312 (making the distinction that the law schools are not being forced 
to accept military recruiters as members of the group as was the case in Dale). 
210. See id. (stating a critical distinction between the forced inclusion in FAIR 
compared with that in Dale). 
211. Id. (the Court stated that the schools are not granted First Amendment pro­
tection simply by stating that they are engaging in expressive activity and that mere 
association would alter the schools' message). 
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speech reasons, and speech is often done most effectively in 
groups.212 
It is apparent that the Court was not concerned with the ap­
pearance that the law schools agree with or at least condone the 
military's policy with respect to its treatment of homosexuals.213 
The Court noted that the Solomon Amendment neither required 
the law schools to express a particular message, nor prevented them 
from expressing a particular message.214 Therefore, the students 
and faculty could proactively voice their disapproval of the mili­
tary's policy. The Court suggested that the students and faculty 
could post signs, flyers, e-mails, and the like, asserting that they dis­
approve of discrimination based on sexual orientation.215 The 
Court even suggested that faculty could organize protests expres­
sing discontent with the military's policy.216 
The law schools' nondiscrimination policies operate in a similar 
manner to the Solomon Amendment. True, in the eyes of the Su­
preme Court, the inclusion of the military as part of a group of 
recruiters allowed on campus is less of an associational activity than 
the inclusion of a member in a student group.217 Nevertheless, the 
law schools' nondiscrimination policies prohibit the CLS from dis­
criminating on the basis of sexual orientation, but do not prevent 
the CLS from disseminating its belief that homosexuality is 
wrong.218 Therefore, as the Court mentioned in FAIR, the CLS 
could post signs, send e-mails, distribute flyers, and at meetings ex­
press their disapproval with homosexuality and the law schools' 
nondiscrimination policies.219 This would counter any suggestion 
that the CLS, by complying with the nondiscrimination policies, 
212. Id. (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984». The Court also 
stated that the government may not require disclosure of membership group lists, or 
impose penalties upon groups disfavored by the government. Id. (citing Brown v. So­
cialists Workers', 74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982); Healy v. 
James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-84 (1972». 
213. See id. at 1312-13. 
214. Id. at 1307. 
215. Id. at 1307, 1313. 
216. Id. at 1307 (the Court cited the Solicitor General's acknowledgement that 
schools "could put signs on the bulletin board next to the door, they could engage in 
speech, they could help organize student protests"). 
217. Id. at 1312 (stating that the forced inclusion of members, as in Dale, is criti­
cally distinct from forcing the schools to grant access to recruiters). 
218. See supra note 133. 
219. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1313 (discussing this right to express disapproval: "Stu­
dents and faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of the military's 
message"). 
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condones homosexuality-and the law schools could do nothing 
about it. If high school students can appreciate the difference be­
tween speech that a group sponsors and speech associated with not 
discriminating because legally required to do so, then "[s]urely stu­
dents have not lost that ability by the time they get to law 
school."220 
No doubt, the FAIR case is not directly analogous to the CLS 
litigation. But there are some very important similarities. For ex­
ample, in FAIR, the law schools had the choice to comply with the 
Solomon Amendment and accept military recruiters or lose fund­
ing.221 Similarly, the CLS has the choice to comply with the nondis­
crimination policies and not discriminate against homosexuals or 
lose recognized status.222 Although the CLS litigation deals with a 
more expressive activity, the CLS is nonetheless placed in a similar 
position as the law schools were in the FAIR case. Both are faced 
with the same uncomfortable choice-comply with the policy or 
lose benefits. However, both have other, more direct means of 
communicating their message, which should relieve a court's con­
cern that the group will be perceived as expressing a message that it 
wishes not to express. 
Consequently, because the Supreme Court was willing to up­
hold the Solomon Amendment over FAIR's expressive association 
claims, a trial or appellate court should uphold law schools' nondis­
crimination polices notwithstanding the CLS's expressive associa­
tion claims. This is so because, first, law students understand that 
the CLS, along with all student groups, is required to be nondis­
criminatory. Second, clear alternative means of communication ex­
ist for the CLS to express its message. Third, the CLS ultimately 
has the choice not to comply with the nondiscrimination policies, as 
did the law schools in FAIR.223 
220. Id. at 1310 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. (Dist. 66) v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995)). 
221. Id. at 1302. 
222. In contrast, the Boy Scouts in Dale had no similar choice. Boy Scouts of 
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). New Jersey's public accommodation laws uncondi­
tionally forced the group to accept homosexuals. Id.; see supra Part ilLA.1. 
223. In FAIR, the law schools had the choice not to comply with the Solomon 
Amendment, but would lose certain federal funds if they did so. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 
1302. Similarly, the CLS has the choice not to comply with the nondiscrimination pol­
icy, in which case it will not be a recognized student group, and will not enjoy the 
benefits of that recognition. 
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3. Healy v. James 
In a similar context to the current controversies, the Court 
opined that there exists an acceptable ground for denying a student 
association official campus recognition notwithstanding its First 
Amendment associational rights.224 In Healy v. James, Justice Pow­
ell wrote, "[a ]ssociational activities need not be tolerated where 
they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substan­
tially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an 
education."225 
Accordingly, if there exists evidence suggesting that a group 
would violate a reasonable regulation, and thus cause "material in­
terruption," the school would not infringe upon the group's First 
Amendment rights by denying it recognized status.226 This senti­
ment was reiterated in Widmar v. Vincent, where the Court stated 
"we affirm the continuing validity of cases ... that recognize a uni­
versity's right to exclude even First Amendment activities that vio­
late reasonable rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity 
of other students to obtain an education."227 Although the Healy 
Court ruled that the school violated the students' association rights, 
it held so because there was insufficient evidence to support the 
conclusion that the student group (SDS) would violate campus 
rules.228 The college actually denied the SDS recognition because 
of the local chapter's affiliation with the national organization, 
which had a reputation for being disruptive.229 
In the CLS cases, the student chapters are not being denied 
recognition because of their affiliation with the national organiza­
tion, but rather because they are asking for an exemption from a 
university regulation. Therefore, the local CLS chapters are violat­
ing a valid campus rule (unless they are granted an exception).23o 
This is a markedly different situation than was present in Healy. 
In Healy, the student group did not violate a reasonable cam­
pus rule, nor did it cause a material interruption. However, here, 
the CLS has violated a reasonable campus rule by not complying 
224. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 185 (1972). 
225. Id. at 189. 
226. Id. 
227. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). 
228. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 184-85. 
229. Id. at 174-76. 
230. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 
Civ. 05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2005), rev'd, 453 F.3d 853 
(7th Cir. 2006) (referring to the nondiscrimination policy as neutral and valid). 
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with the schools' nondiscrimination policies.231 Consequently, the 
denial of official recognition of CLS chapters is consistent with 
Healy.232 
B. 	 The Schools' Nondiscrimination Polices Do Not Violate the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
Conditioning of governmental benefits is constitutional so long 
as it is "viewpoint neutral" and "reasonable."233 Therefore, be­
cause the schools' policies are viewpoint neutral (and applied neu­
trally), and reasonable, they do not violate the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.234 The law schools' nondiscrimination policies 
are facially neutral.235 The policies do not aim to replace the CLS's 
viewpoint.236 The policies only aim to regulate the conduct (dis­
criminatory membership practices against certain classes of people), 
and not the expression that those acts contain.237 In addition, the 
policies are reasonable. Their goals are to prohibit discriminatory 
membership policies because of the social and economic harms that 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, 
age, disability, status as a disabled veteran, sexual orientation, or 
marital status places on the affected groups.238 There is no indica­
tion that such polices are unreasonable.239 
With regard to the ambiguity of the nondiscrimination policies, 
there is some confusion as to their application to student groups. 
For example, the Southern Illinois University School of Law's pol­
231. 	 In this case, as in Healy, there is no obvious material disruption present. 
232. In Christian Legal Society v. Walker, Judge Sykes opined that Healy is legally 
indistinguishable from the controversy involving Southern Illinois University and its 
local CLS chapter and that "no principled factual distinction appears in the present 
record that would justify a contrary conclusion." Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at S. Ill. 
Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2006). This author disagrees 
for the abovementioned reasons. 
233. 	 Kelly, supra note 114, at 268-69. 
234. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 109-117. 
235. Walker, 453 F.3d at 866 ("There can be little doubt that SIU's Affirmative 
Action/EEO policy is viewpoint neutral on its face."); see infra text accompanying notes 
289-294. To be sure, in order to withstand constitutional attack, the schools must neu­
trally apply facially valid nondiscrimination policies. This author assumes that this is so. 
Of course, a selective or discriminatory application of a facially neutral nondiscrimina­
tion policy undermines its constitutional validity. See Walker, 453 F.3d at 866. 
236. 	 Walker, 453 F.3d at 866. 
237. 	 Id. at 2l. 
238. 	 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 93 (1st Cir. 2003). 
239. Cj id. at 97 (holding that the removal of the Boy Scouts from a charitable 
campaign because of their failure to comply with Connecticut's Gay Rights Law was 
reasonable). 
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icy states that it will "provide equal employment and education op­
portunities for all qualified persons without regard to [among other 
things] sexual orientation."24o Judge Sykes of the Seventh Circuit 
recently criticized SIU's application of the policy stating that it is 
"skeptical that CLS violated SIU's Affirmative Action/EEG pol­
icy" because "CLS does not employ anyone" and it is unclear 
whether CLS should be considered an "educational opportu­
nity."241 She admitted, however, that an argument exits that the 
purpose of student organizations at the law school is to provide ed­
ucational opportunities for law students.242 Student groups within 
the university context are most likely educational opportunities. 
The cases of Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin v. South­
worth243 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Vir­
ginia 244 support the view that student organizations play an 
important role in the university educational experience.245 A rea­
sonable interpretation of the schools' nondiscrimination polices 
suggests that the nondiscrimination policies apply to the CLS and 
student groups because student groups are educational opportuni­
ties.246 In sum, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not 
prevent the law schools from conditioning recognized status upon 
only those groups that abide by their nondiscrimination policies. 
1. Evans v. City of Berkeley 
The California Supreme Court recently upheld the constitu­
tionality of nondiscrimination policies within the unconstitutional 
conditions context.247 In Evans, California's highest court upheld 
the application of the city's nondiscrimination policy248 to an organ­
240. Walker, 453 F.3d at 860. 
241. Id. at 860-61. 
242. Id. at 873. 
243. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
244. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
245. Walker, 453 F.3d at 872-73 (Wood, J., dissenting) (noting that both South­
worth and Rosenberger involved student groups in the university context and both rec­
ognized student groups as educational opportunities). 
246. Nonetheless, in order to avoid being struck down due to ambiguity, a 
school's nondiscrimination policy should explicitly state that it applies to its recognized 
student groups. 
247. Evans v. City of Berkeley, 129 P.3d 394, 403-04 (Cal. 2006), cert. denied, 127 
S. Ct. 434 (2006). 
248. The nondiscrimination policy at issue, resolution No. 58,859-N.S., was 
adopted by the Berkeley City Council in March 1997 in response to nonprofit organiza­
tions requesting free marina berths. Id. at 396. 
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ization affiliated with the Boy ScoutS.249 In 1997, the City of Berke­
ley promulgated a policy for granting free marina berths to 
nonprofit community-oriented organizations.25o Pertinent to the is­
sue at hand, the city's nondiscrimination policy prevents discrimina­
tion based on "race, color, religion, ethnicity, national origin, age, 
sex, sexual orientation, marital status, political affiliation, disability 
or medical condition. "251 The city requested that the Berkeley Sea 
Scouts provide a "local policy statement" in order to ensure that 
the Sea Scouts would not discriminate on the basis of sexual orien­
tation.252 The Sea Scouts responded by letter stating that they 
would not discriminate on the basis of sex, race, color, national ori­
gin, political affiliation, religious preference, martial status, physical 
handicap, or medical condition, but did not affirm that they would 
not, nor do not, discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.253 
Although the city was aware that the Sea Scouts had not historically 
discriminated against homosexuals, the city decided to discontinue 
providing free marina berths to the group in light of the group's 
unwillingness to affirmatively comply with the requirements of the 
nondiscrimination policy.254 Consequently, the Sea Scouts filed 
suit, alleging violations of their freedom of speech (including associ­
ation), due process, and equal protection.255 
The court held that the application of the nondiscrimination 
policies did not infringe upon the Sea Scouts' associational free­
dom.256 The court first stated that the city could demand sufficient 
guarantees of nondiscrimination.257 Furthermore, the court noted 
that the United States Supreme Court has generally upheld against 
First Amendment challenges programs of governmental assistance 
that the limit expressive activities for which the funds may be 
249. Id. at 395, 407-08. 
250. Id. at 396. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 397. 
253. Id. The Sea Scouts stated that they believe that "sexual orientation is a pri­
vate matter, and we do not ask either adults or youths to divulge this information at any 
time." Id. The Sea Scouts were unwilling to firmly state that they do not discriminate 
on the basis of sexual orientation in part because they were concerned about losing 
their charter from the Boy Scouts. [d. 
254. Id. at 398. 
255. /d. 
256. Id. at 408. 
257. Id. at 400. 
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used.258 The California court quoted the Supreme Court's decision 
in Rust v. Sullivan:259 
"The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selec­
tively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to 
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an 
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in an­
other way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated 
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activ­
ity to the exclusion of the other. '[A] legislature's decision not to 
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe 
the right."'26o 
The California court, relying on Grove City College v. Bell,261 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has upheld laws that limit 
eligibility for benefits to those organizations that agree in advance 
not to discriminate, notwithstanding First Amendment challenges 
to such policies.262 In Grove City College, the Court held that it was 
constitutional for the state to require that the college comply with 
Title IX's prohibition against discrimination in order to receive cer­
tain federal funding. 263 The California court opined that in Evans, 
the city engaged in similar, permissible behavior when it condi­
tioned free marina berths upon compliance with the city's nondis­
crimination policy.264 In the court's eyes, the City of Berkeley did 
not attempt to prohibit the Sea Scouts from acting in a discrimina­
tory manner, but rather refused to fund such activity.265 
The similarities between Evans and the CLS litigation are ob­
vious. Both deal with groups requesting state-provided recognition 
and benefits. Both involve nondiscrimination policies that condi­
tion those benefits on the group's willingness to comply with a uni­
formly applied nondiscrimination. policy. Accordingly, the Evans 
case supports the notion that the law schools cannot actively force 
the CLS to operate in a nondiscriminatory way, however, it can re­
fuse to support such a group through the student fisc.266 
258. Id. at 401. 
259. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
260. Evans, 129 P.3d at 400 (quoting Rust. 500 U.S. at 193). 
261. Grove City Coil. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
262. Evans, 129 P.3d at 401 (citing Grove City Coli., 465 U.S. at 557-61). 
263. Grove City Coli., 465 U.S. at 557-63. 
264. Evans, 129 P.3d at 402. 
265. Id. (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991». 
266. See id. 
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2. Bob Jones University v. United States 
In Bob Jones University, another case that dealt with unconsti­
tutional conditions, the federal government revoked the Univer­
sity's tax exempt status based on its discriminatory practices.267 
Although Bob Jones University dealt with the Free Exercise 
Clause,268 instead of freedom of speech, the actors in the case were 
situated similarly to those in the CLS litigation.269 In other words, 
both controversies deal with conditioning benefits upon the relin­
quishment of protected First Amendment rights. Consequently, the 
analysis used in Bob Jones University is useful in determining the 
outcome of the current dispute. 
In Bob Jones University,270 the University argued that the ap­
plication of a tax regulation, which revoked the University's tax ex­
empt status based on its racially discriminatory practices,271 violated 
the University's free exercise rights under the First Amendment.272 
Essentially, the University sought state benefits while refusing to 
conform to the conditions for such benefits. The University con­
267. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580-82 (1983). 
268. The First Amendment protects freedom of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects the "right to believe and 
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires." Employment Div., Dep't of Human 
Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). Generally speaking, the First and Four­
teenth Amendments prevent the government from aiding or encumbering religion. Ep­
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I). However, 
the Free Exercise Clause does not protect all behavior based on sincerely held religious 
beliefs. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. Moreover, the Free Exercise Clause does not grant 
religious groups special benefits. See Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 427­
28 (6th Cir. 2002). 
269. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 602-05 (holding that the government can 
condition tax-exempt status on the requirement that the University not discriminate 
based on race, notwithstanding that such discrimination is religiously motivated). 
270. Id. at 574. 
271. Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation not affiliated with any relig­
ious denomination, but it adheres to and teaches fundamentalist Christian religious be­
liefs. [d. at 579-80. The University's discriminatory admissions policy was based on the 
interpretation of the Bible that "race is determined by descendance from one of Noah's 
three sons-Ham, Shem, and Japheth. Based on this interpretation, Orientals and Ne­
groes are Hamitic, Hebrews are Shemitic, and Caucasians are Japhethitic. Cultural or 
biological mixing of the races is regarded as a violation of God's command." Id. at 583 
n.6. Until 1971, African American students were excluded from the University; from 
1971 to 1975 the University accepted no applications from "unmarried Negroes, but did 
accept applications for Negroes married within their race." /d. at 580 (citation omit­
ted). At the time of this case, the University continued to "deny admission to appli­
cants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or 
dating." Id. at 581. 
272. Id. at 602-03. 
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tended that it was not racially discriminatory;273 however, the Court 
quickly and firmly rejected the University's argument, stating that it 
is "firmly established that discrimination on the basis of racial affili­
ation and association is a form of racial discrimination."274 In its 
holding, the Court stated that "not all burdens on religion are un­
constitutional. . . . The state may justify a limitation on religious 
liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding 
governmental interest. "275 
Thus, a state interest may be so compelling that state regula­
tions may limit religious conduct.276 The Court confirmed that the 
denial of tax benefits will no doubt have a substantial impact on the 
University, but would not prohibit them altogether from practicing 
their religious beliefs.277 The Court stated that "the Free Exercise 
Clause provides substantial protection for lawful conduct grounded 
in religious belief."278 However, the government may burden the 
exercise of religion if the state has a compelling interest and "the 
law is the least restrictive means of furthering [that] interest."279 
The Court found that the compelling state interest of eliminating 
racial discrimination in education outweighed the burden placed 
upon the University by de recognizing its tax-exempt status.280 
Likewise, the CLS will be substantially affected if it adheres to 
the nondiscrimination polices, but it would not be prevented from 
existing. Those student groups that do not wish to abide by the 
nondiscrimination policies may still use the schools' facilities and 
engage in lawful discrimination without impediment from the 
schools.281 They just will not receive the benefits of University rec­
ognition. For example, during the 2004-2005 academic year, the 
273. Id. at 605. The University argued that it simply restricted conduct of stu­
dents (prohibiting the association of men and women and interracial marriage), and 
that such restrictions on conduct apply to all races. Id. 
274. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967». 
275. Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,257-58 (1982». 
276. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which held that neu­
tral child labor laws could prevent children from dispensing religious pamphlets on pub­
lic streets without infringing on the free exercise rights of religious groups). 
277. Id. at 603-04. 
278. Id. at 603 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Thomas v. 
Review Bd. of Indus. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963». 
279. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997). 
280. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604. 
281. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 
2006 WL 997217, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 19,2006) (for example, despite not being a 
recognized student group, during the 2004-2005 academic year, the CLS held multiple 
meetings both on and off the University's campus). 
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Hastings chapter of the CLS, although not a recognized student or­
ganization, "held weekly Bible-study meetings, and hosted a beach 
barbeque, a Thanksgiving dinner, a campus lecture on the Christian 
faith and legal practice, several fellowship dinners, an end-of-year 
banquet, and several informal social activities."282 
In Bob Jones University, the Court asserted that the State's 
compelling interest in dissolving discrimination in educational insti­
tutions "substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax ben­
efits places on [the University's] exercise of [its] religious 
beliefs. "283 Similarly, a court should find that the schools' interests 
of eradicating discrimination outweigh the burden placed upon the 
CLS by denying it any benefits associated with recognized status.284 
Since both cases deal with a partial or selective sacrifice of First 
Amendment rights, the Bob Jones University case should persuade 
courts to uphold the nondiscrimination policies involved in the CLS 
litigation. 
C. Regulation of Conduct Versus Expression 
1. Viewpoint Neutrality 
A state regulation that aims to suppress expression because of 
its viewpoint is unconstitutiona1.285 A state regulation is viewpoint 
discriminatory, and thus, is unconstitutional "if its purpose is to im­
pose a differential adverse impact upon a viewpoint."286 Viewpoint 
discrimination is a subset of content discrimination,287 and is espe­
282. Id. at *4. 
283. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604. 
284. Also in Bob Jones University, the Court found that denying the University 
tax exempt status did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 604 n.30. The Court 
opined that the tax policy was neutral and secular, and the mere fact that it happened to 
burden the religious tenets of the University did not constitute a violation of the Estab­
lishment Clause. Id. The Court mentioned that the fact that the policy is applied to all 
religious schools "avoids the necessity for a[n] ... inquiry into whether a racially restric­
tive practice is the result of sincere religious belief." Id. at 604-05 (emphasis omitted) 
(citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 155 (4th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979». Similarly, the public law schools apply 
their nondiscrimination policy to any student organization that wishes to receive recog­
nized status. Crow, JSOF, supra note 126, 'lI'lI 34-36. Consequently, the school policies 
also do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
285. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989) (citing Clark v. 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984». 
286. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 94 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992». 
287. "Viewpoint discrimination is a subset of content discrimination;" content 
based regulation regulates speech based on the substance of the message, whereas view­
point regulation goes beyond the substance and takes aim at the position the speaker 
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cially repugnant to the First Amendment because it targets the 
speech based on the government's agreement or disagreement with 
the position that the speaker wishes to promote.288 In the CLS liti­
gation, the schools' nondiscrimination policies are viewpoint neu­
traJ.289 They are facially neutral because the policies prohibit 
discriminatory membership practices of all recognized student 
groups not because of the viewpoints the student groups wish to 
express, but because of the social harms that discriminatory prac­
tices cause homosexuals.290 
Nevertheless, a facially. viewpoint neutral law may be view­
point discriminatory if its purpose is to impose an adverse impact 
upon a particular viewpoint.291 Justice Scalia acknowledged in 
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul that, "Where the government does not 
target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not 
shielded from regulation merely because they express a discrimina­
tory idea or philosophy."292 However, the purpose of the universi­
ties' nondiscrimination policies is not to impose an adverse impact 
upon the CLS's view that homosexuality is wrong; rather, the intent 
of these policies is to prevent the act of discrimination. For exam­
ple, the nondiscrimination policies require that a group dedicated to 
helping African American students admit all male and female stu­
dents.293 Moreover, the nondiscrimination policies apply to all stu­
dent organizations seeking recognized status and they apply 
without regard to their message. Consequently, the nondiscrimina­
tion policies are "content-neutral."294 
takes. Rodney A. Smolla, Content-Neutral Versus Content-Based Distinction, 1 SMOLLA 
& NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:9, 3-11 (2006) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. 781). 
288. Id. 
289. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (2006) (emphasis added) 
(regarding the nondiscrimination policy in that case, Judge Sykes stated "(tJhere can be 
little doubt that SIU's Affirmative ActionlEEO policy is viewpoint neutral on its face, but 
as the record stands, there is strong evidence that the policy has not been applied in a 
viewpoint neutral way"). 
290. See, e.g., Wyman, 335 F.3d at 93. 
291. Id. at 94. 
292. R.A.Y. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992). 
293. Id. at 6. 
294. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983) (citing U.S. Postal Servo V. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 
(1981); Consol. Edison CO. V. Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980); 
Grayned V. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972); Cantwell V. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider V. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)). 
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2. Regulation of Conduct Versus Expression 
Notwithstanding the forum where speech occurs, states may re­
strict or even ban an expressive activity, not because of the idea that 
it expresses, but because of "the action it entails. "295 In other 
words, state regulations must focus on conduct, not the expression 
therein; otherwise the regulation runs the risk of being viewpoint 
discriminatory, which is unconstitutional.296 
This expression/conduct dichotomy was discussed in United 
States v. O'Brien.297 In O'Brien, the Court held that a statute that 
prohibited the burning of draft cards was not on its face in violation 
of the First Amendment because the burning of a draft card is not 
inherently expressive.298 The Court went on to state that "when 
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course 
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu­
lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on 
First Amendment freedoms."299 
This dichotomy was also present in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Wyman.3OO There, the court examined whether the removal of the 
Boy Scouts from Connecticut's workplace charitable campaign on 
the basis of its discriminatory practices violated the Scouts' First 
Amendment rights.301 In Wyman, the State Employee Campaign 
Committee, which governed the state's annual campaign to raise 
funds from state employees for various charitable purposes, re­
voked the Scouts' eligibility to receive donations302 in accordance 
with a ruling by the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and 
Opportunities (CHRO).303 The CHRO's ruling was based on its 
295. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added). 
296. See id. at 390. 
297. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court developed an in­
termediate scrutiny test for state regulatory action that has an incidental effect on ex­
pression. Id. at 376-77. However, Dale requires application of strict scrutiny. See 
supra text accompanying note 183. Nonetheless, O'Brien's discussion of the distinction 
between regulating conduct and expression is instructive. 
298. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 446 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375). 
299. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
300. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2003). 
301. Id. 
302. Id. at 86. 
303. Id. at 85. "The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportuni­
ties ... is the independent state agency that is 'charged with the primary responsibility 
of determining whether discriminatory practices have occurred and what the appropri­
ate remedy for such discrimination must be.'" Id. (quoting Dep't of Health Servs. v. 
Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rei. Mason, 503 A.2d 1151, 1156 (Conn. 
1986)). 
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opinion that if the Scouts were allowed to participate in the charita­
ble campaign, then it would be a violation of Connecticut's Gay 
Rights Law.304 
The court focused on the permissible regulation of conduct by 
the state versus the constitutionally impermissible regulation of ex­
pression.305 The court noted that, on its face, the Connecticut Gay 
Rights Law prohibited "discriminatory membership and employ­
ment policies not because of the viewpoints such policies express, 
but because of the immediate harms-like the denial of concrete 
economic and social benefits-that such discrimination causes 
homosexuals."306 Thus, the court opined, the law regulated "em­
ployment policies as conduct, not expression, and as such, is not 
obviously viewpoint discriminatory."307 
Similarly, the law schools' policies regulate CLS membership 
as conduct, not as expression. The law schools' policies do not seek 
to regulate groups based on their religious viewpoint or message, 
but instead aim to prohibit the act of discrimination. In fact, the 
nondiscrimination policies prohibit the act of discrimination by any 
student organization seeking recognition, whether it is an African 
American student group, a religious group, or a gay rights group.308 
Accordingly, the law schools' nondiscrimination policies regulate 
conduct. In addition, they are viewpoint neutral. Thus, the act of 
discrimination (preventing non-Christian students and homosexuals 
from becoming members) is subject to regulation, in spite of its ef­
fect on the student groups' expressive association. 
3. The Designated Public Forum 
The law schools have created a limited public forum by encour­
aging and accommodating student associations and groups.309 
Therefore, in light of this forum and the conduct/expression dichot­
omy, the remaining constitutional question is whether the view­




308. See Crow, Del's Response to Pl.'s Motion for Summ. J., supra note 137. 
309. See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that the University 
of Virginia created a limited public forum when it created an extracurricular program 
for student groups); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267, 276, 277 (1981) (finding that 
the University created an open forum when it created an extracurricular program en­
couraging the organization of student groups and granting such groups recognized 
status). 
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point neutral policies are "necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest" and are "narrowly drawn to achieve that end."310 
The nondiscrimination policies apply to every student organi­
zation seeking recognized status.311 Also, the policies regulate stu­
dent groups' membership selection, but they do not regulate what 
student groups have to say.312 The next question is whether the 
schools have a compelling interest that the policies promote. The 
schools wish to exclude the CLS from receiving benefits unless they 
are willing to abide by the schools' nondiscrimination policy.313 The 
law schools' interests are to promote discourse, honesty, openness, 
and respect for the rights of individuals, inclusion, and diversity.314 
Generally, nondiscrimination statutes and regulations are promul­
gated to prevent the social and economic harms that discrimination 
causes.315 The Supreme Court has held such interests to be compel­
ling in the university context.316 The law schools' interests in the 
CLS litigation are similar to those in Grutter v. Bollinger, and those 
generally accepted as articulated in Wyman, and the law schools 
have a compelling interest in eradicating the social harms of dis­
crimination and facilitating an inclusive and diverse student body 
amongst its recognized student groups. 
The last question is whether the nondiscrimination policies are 
narrowly tailored.317 In this case, the nondiscrimination policies 
prohibit discrimination not amongst all student groups, but only 
310. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
311. See Crow, Def's Response to Pl. 's Motion for Summ. J., supra note 137, at 4. 
312. Cf Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150, 175 (2002). Holding an ordinance, which Watchtower argued restricted speech, to 
be constitutional, stating "[t]he ordinance is content neutral and does not bar anyone 
from going door-to-door in Stratton. It merely regulates the manner in which one must 
canvass: A canvasser must first obtain a permit." Id. 
313. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. Civ. 
05-4070-GPM, 2005 WL 1606448, at *1 (S.D. Ill. July 5, 2005); Christian Legal Soc'y 
Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-4484 JSW, 2005 WL 850864, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 12,2005); Pl.'s V. Compl., Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at Ariz. State Univ. ColI. 
of Law v. Crow, No. CV-04-2572-PHX-NVW, 'lI'lI 4.3,4.5,4.9 (D. Ariz. Nov. 17,2004). 
314. See Crow, Def's Response to Pl.'s Motion for Summ. J., supra note 137,3:1­
8. 
315. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 93 (2d Cir. 2003). 
316. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003) (concluding that U.S. law 
schools have a "compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body" and that "at­
taining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional 
mission, and that 'good faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing 
to the contrary' "). 
317. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983) (citing U.S. Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,132 
(1981); Con sol. Edison CO. V. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980); Grayned 
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those groups seeking university recognition.3lB They apply to dis­
criminatory membership practices, but do not in any other way re­
strict student groups' speech.319 Therefore, such policies are 
narrowly tailored. Consequently, under the designated public fo­
rum analysis, a court should find the nondiscrimination policies, 
which prevent discrimination, to be constitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
The outcome of this litigation will influence public universities 
and the way they educate students. If the CLS is granted an exemp­
tion from the law schools' nondiscrimination policies, a university 
would thus need to consider whether any group could discriminate 
against individuals based on a sincerely held religious belief or con­
sider whether it is justified in granting an exception to a religious 
group like the CLS, while denying another religious group the abil­
ity to discriminate based on a sincerely held religious belief, for ex­
ample, based on race.320 In sum, the CLS should not be granted an 
exemption from nondiscrimination policies, just as other student or­
ganizations are not. In conditioning recognized status upon the 
promise not to discriminate, the law schools are not violating the 
CLS's freedom of speech. 
Christian A. Malanga 
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)). 
318. Crow, Del's Response to Pl.'s Motion for Summ. J., supra note 137, at 6. 
Student groups that do not wish to abide by the nondiscrimination policies may use the 
schools' facilities and engage in lawful discrimination without impediment from the 
schools. [d. at 10 n.4. 
319. See supra text accompanying notes 217-220. 
320. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 575, 583 n.6 (1983) (the Court 
noted the University's interpretation of the Bible that "race is determined by 
descendance from one of Noah's three sons-Ham, Shem, and Japheth. Based on this 
interpretation, Orientals and Negroes are Hamitic, Hebrews are Shemitic, and Cauca­
sians are Japhethitic. Cultural or biological mixing of the races is regarded as a viola­
tion of God's command"). 
